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RECENT DECISIONS
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-CIVIL PROCEDURE-DUE PROCESS REQUIREMENTS
FOR STATE JURISDICTION OVER FoREIGN CoRPORATIONs-The plaintiff, a nonresident of Ohio, brought an action in Ohio against the defendant, a sociedad
anonima organized under the laws of the Philippine Islands, on claims which
neither arose in Ohio nor were connected with the defendant's activities in
Ohio. Defendant's president, who was also its general manager and principal
stockholder, had returned to his home in Ohio when the company's mining
operations were suspended by the Japanese occupation of the Philippines. During
the war years, he conducted such business as was possible in Ohio, holding
directors' meetings, carrying on correspondence, maintaining bank accounts,
but the defendant did not appoint a statutory agent or otherwise consent to service
of process in Ohio. Process was served upon the defendant's president, but the
Ohio Supreme Court, after ruling that the defendant's legal status under
Philippine law was equivalent to that of a corporation, granted defendant's
motion to quash service on the ground that a state court had no jurisdiction
in personam over a foreign corporation without that corporation's consent when
the cause of action did not arise from corporate activities within the state.1
Despite some question whether the Ohio court's decision rested on federal
constitutional grounds,2 the United States Supreme Court granted certiorari and
vacated the judgment, holding: the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process clause
does not prohibit state jurisdiction in the instant case, even though the corporation has not expressly consented to jurisdiction and the cause of action was
unconnected with the defendant's activities within the state. Perkins v. Benguet
Consolidated Mining Co., 342 U.S. 437, 72 S. Ct. 413 (1952).
In the absence of express consent to jurisdiction,3 state jurisdiction in
personam over foreign corporations doing business within the state has, historically, found constitutional basis in the theories of implied consent4 and
corporate presence. 5 These theories, both fictional in nature, 6 were employed
Perkins v. Benguet Consolidated Mining Co., 155 Ohio St. 116, 98 N.E. 33 (1951).
Vinson, C. J., and Minton, J., dissenting, felt that the writ of certiorari should have
been dismissed because no federal question was raised. 342 U.S. 437 at 449, 72 S.Ct. 413
(1952).
3 This note is limited to a consideration of cases in which the corporation is doing
business within the state without complying with statutory requirements as to consent
to service of process. Where there is express consent, the only question is the scope of that
consent, as determined by the state statute of the corporation's stipulation, and such consent
may well include causes of action unconnected with the corporation's activities within the
state. Smolik v. Philadelphia & Reading Coal and hon Co., (D.C. N.Y. 1915) 222 F. 148;
Pennsylvania Fire Ins. Co. v. Gold Issue Mining & Milling Co., 243 U.S. 93, 37 S.Ct. 344
(1917).
4 Lafayette Ins. Co. v. Frencli, 18 How. (59 U.S.) 404 (1855); Connecticut Mutual
Life Ins. Co. v. Spratley, 172 U.S. 602, 19 S.Ct. 308 (1899).
5 Int'l Harvester Co. v. Kentucky, 234 U.S. 579, 34 S.Ct. 944 (1914); Philadelphia
& Reading Ry. Co. v. McKibbin, 243 U.S. 264, 37 S.Ct. 280 (1917); Louisville & Nashville R. Co. v. Chatters, 279 U.S. 125, 49 S.Ct. 329 (1929).
6 For discussions of the fictional nature of these theories and their frequent inadequacy,
see HENDERSON, THE PosITION OF FoREIGN CoRPORATIONS IN AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL
LA.w 87-96 (1918); 1 BEALE, CONFLICT OF LAWS, §§89.6 and 89.7; GooDRICH, CONFLICT
OF LA.ws §76 (1949).
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in causes of action arising out of the corporation's activity within the state7
where it was felt that jurisdiction was justjfied, upon proper service of process,8
by the amount of corporate activity within the state. However, where the cause
of action was unconnected with corporate activity within the state, it was not
clear, prior to the Perkins decision, whether the Fourteenth Amendment Due
Process clause permitted such a fictional extension of jurisdiction.9 The two
leading Supreme Court decisions on the question ruled that the requirements of
due process limited the use of the fiction of implied consent to cases arising
out of corporate activity within the state,10 but Cardozo, in a notable New York .
decision,11 proceeded on a presence theory and held that once the corporation
was found _to be "present". within the state, the court could take jurisdiction
over any transitory cause of action against the corporation. More recently,
in the case of International. Shoe Co. v. State of Washington,12 Chief Justice
Stone completely rejected the use of both of these fictions as. bases for state jurisdiction, and directed judicial attention to a more realistic, if not a more definite,13
test of valid state jurisdiction, namely, state jurisdiction in personam over a
foreign corporation fulfills the requirements of due process if the corporation's
activities within the state establish sufficient contacts or ties with the state to
make jurisdiction "reasonable and just, according to our traditional conception
of fair play and substantial justice."14 Although this ''balancing of interests"
approach was limited, in the International Shoe case, to causes of action arising
out of corporate activities within the state,15 it is submitted that its extension
in the Perkins case to actions unconnected with the corporation's activities
within the state is both consistent and sound. It seems settled that if a natural
person has been served with process within a state on a transitory cause of action,
the state court has jurisdiction even thpugh the cause of action has no relation
7 A distinction should be drawn between the geographical origin of the cause of action
and its connection with corporate activities in a given state. Thus, the cause of action
may arise in State X and still be connected with corporate activity in State Y.
s It will be assumed in this note that the "notice" requirement of the Fourteenth
Amendment Due Process clause has been fulfilled.
9 Holding that such jurisdiction violated due process: Old Wayne Mutual Life Assn. v.
McDonough, 204 U.S. 8, 27 S.Ct. 236 (1907); Simon v. Southern Ry. Co., 236 U.S. 115,
35 S.Ct. 255 (1914); Fry v. Denver & Rio Grande R., (D.C. Cal. 1915) 226 F. 893;
Takacs v. Philadelphia & Reading Ry. Co., (D.C. N.Y. 1915) 228 F. 728. Contra: Tauza
v. Susquehanna Coal Co., 220 N.Y. 259, 115 N.E. 915 (1917); Reynolds v. Missouri,
K. & T. Ry. Co., 228 Mass. 584, 117 N.E. 913 (1917), affd. without opinion, 255 U.S.
565, 41. S.Ct. 446 (1920). And see Barrow S.S. Co. v. Kane, 170 U.S. 100, 18 S.Ct. 526
(1898); St. Louis S.W. Ry. Co. v. Alexander, 227 U.S. 218, 33 S.Ct. 245 (1913). For
a detailed discussion of the state of authority prior to the Perkins case, see Fead, "Jurisdiction Over Foreign Corporations," 24 MxcH. L. REv. 633 (1926) and Osborne, "Arising Out
of Business Done iil the State,'' 7 MINN. L. REv. 380 (1923).
10 Old Wayne Mutual Life Assn. v. McDonough, supra note 9; Simon v. Southern Ry.
Co., supra note 9. In both cases service of process was upon a state officer and the fact of
inadequate notice bulked large.
11 Tauza v. Susquehanna Coal Co., supra note 9.
12 326 U.S. 310, 66 S.Ct. 154 (1945).
13 See McBaine, "Jurisdiction Over Foreign Corporations,'' 34 CAuF. L. REv. 331
(1946), criticizing the Stone test for its vagueness.
14 Int'l. Shoe Co. v. State of Washington, supra note 12.
15 Ibid.
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to the defendant's presence within the state. No reason appears why the
due process clause should automatically compel a different result when the
defendant is a foreign corporation. Moreover, the early decisions to the effect
that such jurisdiction was contrary to due process had given rise to the anomaly
that a corporation which did business in a state without complying with the
statutory requirements as to the appointment of an agent to receive process on all
actions was in a better position, in terms of freedom from jurisdiction, than a
corporation which obeyed the law.16 In treating the due process limitation as
simply a requirement of "general fairness" to the defendant,17 the Perkins
decision permits a wider discretion to the state courts in taking jurisdiction over
foreign corporations having minimum contacts with the state without undue
hardship to the defendant corporation. It indicates that the thrust of the law
is away from a consideration of the jurisdictional question in terms of physical
power over the corporate entity to a more sophisticated "estimate of the inconveniences"18 in the individual case.

Richard D. Rohr

16 See

Hand's analysis in Smolik v. Philadelphia & Reading Coal & Iron Co., supra

note 3.
17 Principal case at 445. It is significant that the Court placed no special emphasis in hs
decision on the fact that defendant was a "corporation in exile" and not amenable to suit
in its home jurisdiction.
18 Int'l. Shoe Co. v. State of Washington, supra note 12. For discussions of the impact
of the Int'l. Shoe Doctrine, see Hand, J:, in Kilpatrick v. Texas and P. Ry. Co., (2d Cir.
1948) 166 F. (2d) 788, and 16 UNiv. Cm. L. REv. 5?3 (1949).

